Abstract. We describe a digital signature scheme in which the public key is xed but the secret signing key is updated at regular intervals so as to provide a forward security property: compromise of the current secret key does not enable an adversary to forge signatures pertaining to the past. This can be useful to mitigate the damage caused by key exposure without requiring distribution of keys. Our construction uses ideas from the Fiat-Shamir and Ong-Schnorr identi cation and signature schemes, and is proven to be forward secure based on the hardness of factoring, in the random oracle model. The construction is also quite e cient.
Introduction
This paper presents a digital signature scheme having a novel security property, namely \forward security." This is a means to mitigate the damage caused by key exposure.
The key exposure problem
In practice the greatest threat against the security of a digital signature scheme is exposure of the secret (signing) key, due to compromise of the security of the underlying system or machine storing the key. The danger of successful cryptanalysis of the signature scheme itself is hardly as great as the danger of key exposure, as long as we stick to well-known schemes and use large security parameters.
The most widely considered solution to the problem of key exposure is distribution of the key across multiple servers via secret sharing 18, 5] . There are numerous instantiations of this idea including threshold signatures 7] and proactive signatures 14]. Distribution however is quite costly. While a large corporation or a certi cation authority might be able to distribute their keys, the average user, with just one machine, does not have this option. Thus while we expect digital signatures to be very widely used, we do not expect most people to have the luxury of splitting their keys across several machines. Furthermore even when possible, distribution may not provide as much security as one might imagine. For example, distribution is susceptible to \common-mode failures:" a system \hole" that permits break-in might be present on all the machines since they are probably running a common operating system, and once found, all the machines can be compromised.
Other ways of protecting against key exposure include use of protected hardware or smartcards, but these can be costly or impractical.
Forward secure signatures
The goal of forward security is to protect some aspects of signature security against the risk of exposure of the secret signing key, but in a simple way, in particular without requiring distribution or protected storage devices, and without increasing key management costs.
How is it possible to preserve any security in the face of key exposure without distribution or protected devices? Obviously, we cannot hope for total security. Once a signing key is exposed, the attacker can forge signatures. The idea of \forward security" is however that a distinction can be made between the security of documents pertaining to (meaning dated in) the past (the time prior to key exposure) and those pertaining to the period after key exposure. The key evolution paradigm. A user begins, as usual, by registering a public key PK and keeping private the corresponding secret key, which we denote SK 0 . The time during which the public key PK is desired to be valid is divided into periods, say T of them, numbered 1; : : : ; T. While the public key stays xed, the user \evolves" the secret key with time. Thus in each period, the user produces signatures using a di erent signing key: SK 1 in period 1, SK 2 in period 2, and so on. The secret key in period i is derived as a function of the one in the previous period; speci cally, when period i begins, the user applies a public oneway function h to SK i?1 to get SK i . At that point, the user also deletes SK i? 1 . Now an attacker breaking in during period i will certainly get key SK i , but not the previous keys SK 0 ; : : : ; SK i?1 , since they have been deleted. (Furthermore the attacker cannot obtain the old keys from SK i because the latter was a oneway function of the previous key.) The key evolution paradigm is illustrated in Figure 1 .
A signature always includes the value j of the time period during which it was produced, so that it is viewed as a pair hj; i. The veri cation algorithm takes the ( xed) public key PK , a message and candidate signature, and veri es that the signature is valid in the sense that it was produced by the legitimate user in the period indicated in the signature. We stress that although the user's secret key evolves with time, the public key stays xed throughout, so that the signature veri cation process is unchanged, as are the public key certi cation and management processes.
The number of periods and the length of each period are parameters of choice. For example, we might want to use the scheme under a certain public key for one year, with daily updates, in which case T = 365 and each period has length one day. Security benefits. The security bene t of this key evolution paradigm is that loss of the current secret key will not enable the adversary to forge signatures with a \date" prior to the one at which key exposure occurred. This \date" has a precise meaning: it is the value of the period during which the signature is (claimed to be) produced, which as indicated above is always included in the signature itself. This can be viewed as a means of protecting the authenticity of past transactions even in the event of key exposure. It is quite a useful property and can mitigate the damage of key exposure in several ways.
The following example, based on an idea due to Di e, illustrates. Suppose Eve's mortgage payment is due on the rst of each month. When it is delivered to the bank, the bank issues a signed and dated receipt. First suppose we are using a standard (not forward-secure) signature scheme. Then for example, if Eve paid $1,000 on January 1st 1999, the text \Eve paid $1,000 on January 1st, 1999" is signed under the public key of the bank. On February 1st, Eve is broke and doesn't pay, and of course the bank issues no receipt. But on February 2nd, Eve cracks the bank computer. Under this normal signing scheme, she gets the signing key, and can forge a note saying \Eve paid $1,000 on February 1st, 1999". But not under a forward secure scheme. Under a forward secure scheme (assuming daily key updates) the signature that would have been produced on February 1st would have the form h32; i where is a tag for the text \Eve paid $1,000," and we are assuming for simplicity that the scheme is initialized on January 1st, so that February 1st, being the 32nd day of the year, has corresponding date or period the number \32". Eve gets only the signing key for February 2nd, the 33rd period. She could forge any signature of the form hj; i for j 33, for any text of her choice, but not one of the form h32; i. So she cannot claim to have paid up on February 1st. Relation to time-stamping. Time-stamping signed documents via a trusted time stamping authority (cf. 13]) can also provide a similar kind of security, but this requires that one make use of such an authority, which is costly in various ways. Forward security may be viewed as providing a certain kind of time-stamp, namely one that is secure against forgery by an adversary who obtains the current secret key. (However it assumes the signer is honest since the signer could of course \forge" time-stamps if it wanted by simply not deleting previous keys.) History. The term (perfect) \forward secrecy" was rst used in 12] in the context of session key exchange protocols, and later in 8]. The basic idea, as described in 8], is that compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session keys, meaning that past actions are protected in some way against loss of the current key, the same basic idea as here in a di erent context. The above paradigm and the idea of a digital scheme with forward security were suggested by Ross Andersen in an invited lecture at the ACM CCS conference 1]. He left as an open problem to nd such a scheme. In this paper we provide the rst solution. We also provide a formal adversarial model and notion of security with respect to which the security of schemes can be assessed. In particular we suggest the inclusion of the current date in the signature and the use of the claimed date as the determinant of whether something is past or present from the forward security point of view.
1.3 Construction of a forward secure digital signature scheme First ideas. It is trivial to design a forward secure signature scheme if you allow any of scheme parameters to grow proportionally with the number T of time periods over which the scheme is supposed to be valid; speci cally, if the size of the public key, secret key, or the signature itself is allowed to be proportional to T. We brie y describe these methods in Section 2. However, any such method is impractical.
The rst reasonable solution, also described in Section 2, involves the use of binary tree based certi cation chains, and results in secret keys and signatures of size linear in lg(T ). Ideally however we would like a solution in which the size of the public key, secret key, and signature does not depend on the number of time periods. But achieving forward security in this setting does not seem so easy. A natural starting idea is to try to nd a suitable key evolution mechanism for standard RSA or El Gamal type schemes, but we were unable to nd a secure one in either case. Our scheme. To get a forward-secure digital signature scheme of the desired kind, we turn to a di erent paradigm: construction of signature schemes based on identi cation schemes. We present a forward secure digital signature scheme based on ideas underlying the Fiat-Shamir 10] and Ong-Schnorr 16] identication and signature schemes. The feature of these schemes that is crucial to enable secure key evolution is that even the signer does not need to know the factorization of the modulus on which the scheme is based, but just the square roots of some public values. We evolve the secret key via squaring, which is a one-way function in this setting. Notion of security. To provide assurance that our scheme has the forward security property, we rst provide a formal de nition of forward security for digital signatures, extending the notion of security for standard digital signatures from 11] to allow for key exposure attacks. Our model allows the adversary to mount a chosen-message attack, then expose the signing key at some current period j of its choice. It is successful if it can forge a signature of the form hi; i for some message M where i < j pertains to a period prior to that of the key exposure. The scheme is secure if this task is computationally infeasible. Forward security of our scheme. We then show that our scheme meets this notion of forward security assuming it is hard to factor Blum-Williams integers.
This proof is in the random oracle model 3], meaning it assumes that a certain hash function used in the scheme has random behavior.
Our security analysis proceeds in two steps. We rst de ne a notion of a \forward secure identi cation (ID) scheme," design such a scheme, and prove it secure based on the hardness of factoring Blum-Williams integers. Our signature scheme is obtained from the ID scheme by the usual transformation of ID schemes into signature schemes (in which the challenge is speci ed as a hash of the message and the commitment). We then show that this transformation preserves forward security. (The transformation is known to preserve security in the standard sense 17, 15] , but here we are considering a new security feature.)
We stress one issue with regard to forward secure ID schemes: they are articial constructs, in the sense that the security notion we put forth there, although mathematically viable, does not correspond to any real attack in a practical setting. (This is because identi cation is an on-line activity, unlike signature verication; one cannot return to the past and try to identify oneself.) But this does not matter in our setting, because for us, the ID scheme is simply a convenient abstraction that enables our construction of a forward secure signature scheme, and the latter is a real and useful object.
Our goal here has been to present the simplest possible scheme that has the forward security property, is reasonably e cient, and can be proven secure. Improvements and alternatives seem possible. In particular one could try to build a scheme only in the Ong-Schnorr style (rather than a combination of that with Fiat-Shamir as we do). This will reduce key sizes, but increase computation time, and the analysis (one could try to extend 19]) seems more involved. A note on synchronization. One might imagine that a scheme using time periods in the way we do will impose a requirement for clock synchronization, arising from disagreements near the time period boundaries over what is truly the current time. However, in our signature scheme, discrepancies over time periods do not cause problems. This is due to the fact that the time period in which the message was signed is stamped on the message, and the veri er looks at this stamp to determine which veri cation process to use. That is, it doesn't matter what the time period of veri cation is; the signature is veri ed using the information from the time period when the signature actually occurred.
Some simple solutions
We summarize several simple ways to design a forward secure signature scheme. The rst three methods result in impractical schemes: some parameter (the public key size, the secret key size, or the signature size) grows linearly with the number T of time periods over which the public key is supposed to be valid. The methods are nonetheless worth a brief look in order to better understand the problem and to lead into the fourth method. The latter, which we call the tree scheme, is a reasonable binary certi cation tree based solution in which key and signature sizes are logarithmic in T. Nonetheless it would be preferable if even this dependency is avoided, which is accomplished by our main scheme presented in Section 3.
In the following we make use of some xed standard digital signature scheme whose signing and verifying algorithms are denoted SGN and VF respectively.
Long public and secret keys. The signer generates T pairs (p 1 ; s 1 ); : : : ; (p T ; s T ) of matching public and secret keys for the standard scheme. He sets the public key of the key evolving scheme to (p 1 ; : : : ; p T ) and his starting (base) secret key for the key evolving scheme to (s 0 ; s 1 ; : : : ; s T ) where s 0 is the empty string. Upon entering period j the signer deletes s j?1 , so that he is left with key (s j ; : : : ; s T ). The signature of a message m in period j is hj; SGN sj (m)i. A signature hj; i on a message m is veri ed by checking that VF pj (m; ) = 1. This method clearly provides forward security, but the size of the keys (both public and secret) of the key evolving scheme depends on T, which is not desirable.
Long secret key only. Andersen 1] suggested the following variant which results in a short public key but still has a secret key of size proportional to T. Generate T key-pairs as above, and an additional pair (p; s). Let j = SGN s (jkp j ) be a signature (with respect to p) of the value j together with the j-th public key, for j = 1; : : : ; T. This done, delete s. The public key of the key evolving scheme is p, and the signer's starting (base) secret key for the key evolving scheme is (s 0 ; 0 ; s 1 ; 1 ; : : : ; s T ; T ) where s 0 ; 0 are set to the empty string. Upon entering period j the signer deletes s j?1 ; j?1 , so that he is left with secret key (s j ; j ; : : : ; s T ; T ). The signature of a message m in period j is hj; (SGN sj (m); p j ; j )i. A signature hj; ( ; q; )i on a message m is veri ed by checking that VF q (m; ) = 1 and VF p (jkq; ) = 1. This method, like the above, clearly provides forward security. (Notice that it is crucial for the forward security that s be deleted as soon as the signatures of the subkeys have been generated.) Furthermore the public key has size independent of T. But the size of the secret key still depends on T.
Long signatures. The size of both the public and the secret key can be kept small by using certi cation chains, but this results in large signatures. The signer begins by generating a key pair (p 0 ; s 0 ) of the standard scheme. He sets the public key of the key evolving scheme to p 0 and the starting (base) secret key of the key evolving scheme to s 0 . At each period a new key is generated and certi ed with respect to the previous key, which is then deleted. The certi cate chain is included in the signature. To illustrate, at the start of period 1 the signer creates a new key pair (p 1 ; s 1 ), sets 1 Again, forward security is clearly provided. Furthermore both the public and the secret key are of size independent of T. But the size of a signature grows linearly with T. Also note that although the size of the signer's secret key has shrunk, the signer does have to store the list of public keys and their tags, which means it must use storage linear in T, which is not desirable.
Binary certification tree scheme. Andersen's scheme above can be viewed as building a certi cation tree of depth 1 and arity T, while the \long signature" solution just presented builds a standard certi cation chain, which is a tree of depth T and arity 1. Signature size is linear in the depth, and key size is linear in the arity. It is natural to form a \hybrid" scheme so as to get the best possible tradeo between these sizes. Namely we use a binary tree with T leaves. Each key certi es its two children keys. The leaf keys are the actual message signing keys, one for each period, and the root public key is the public key of the key evolving scheme. The tree grows down from the root in a speci c manner, with nodes being created dynamically. A node certi es its two children, and as soon as the two children nodes are created and certi ed, the secret key corresponding to the parent node is deleted. Appropriately done this results in a forward secure scheme with secret key size and signature size linear in lg(T ), and xed public key size. Furthermore the total amount of information (whether secret or not) stored at any time by the signer, and the computation time for key updates, are linear in lg(T ).
One has to be a little careful to build the tree in the right way and delete keys at the right times, so let us give a few more details. For simplicity assume T = 2 is a power of two. Imagine a binary tree with T leaves. The root is at level 0 and the leaves are at level . The root is labeled with the empty string ", and if a node has label the binary string w then its left child is labeled w0 and its right child is labeled w1. Associate to a node with label w a key pair (p w]; s w]). (The entire tree never exists at any time, but is useful to imagine.)
The public key of the key evolving scheme is p "]. Let hi; ni denote the binary representation of the integer i ? 1 as a string of exactly n bits.
In period j 1 the signer signs data under s hj; i], and attaches a certication chain based on the path from leaf hj; i to the root of the tree. During period j, a certain subtree T of the full tree exists. It consists of all nodes on the path from leaf hj; i to the root, plus the right sibling of any of these nodes that is a left child of its parent. All childless nodes w in the subtree that are right children of their parents have their secret key s w] still attached; for all other nodes, it has been deleted. Notice that if a node w has s w] still \alive," its descendent leaves have names hi; i with i > j, so correspond to future periods.
When the signer enters period j + 1 (here j < T) it must update its subtree.
This involves (possibly) creation of new nodes, and deletion of old ones in such a way that the property of the subtree described above is preserved. The signer moves up from hj; i (deleting this leaf node and its keys) and stops at the rst node whose left (rather than right) child is on the path from hj; i to the root.
Call this node w. We know that the secret key of its right child w1 is alive. If w1 is a leaf, the update is complete. Else, create its children by picking new key pairs for each child, and delete the secret key at w. Then move left, and continue this process until a leaf is reached.
One can show that the scheme has the desired properties.
3 Our forward-secure signature scheme As the code indicates, the keys contain some sundry information in addition to that mentioned above. Speci cally the number T of time periods is thrown into the public key. This enables the veri er to know its value, which might vary with di erent signers. It is also thrown into the secret key for convenience, as is the modulus N. The third component of the base secret key, namely \0", is there simply to indicate that this is the base key, in light of the fact that the key will be evolving later. The modulus is a Blum-Williams integer, meaning the product of two distinct primes each congruent to 3 mod 4. We refer to U i as the i-th component of the public key.
The public key PK is treated like that of any ordinary signature scheme as far as registration, certi cation and key generation are concerenced. The base secret key SK 0 is stored privately. The factors p; q of N are deleted once the key generation process is complete, so that they are not available to an attacker that might later break into the system on which the secret key is stored. Key evolution. During time period j, the signer signs using key SK j . This key is generated at the start of period j, by applying a key update algorithm to the key SK j?1 . (The latter is the base secret key when j = 1.) The update algorithm is presented below. It squares the l points of the secret key at the previous stage to get the secret key at the next stage. Return SK j Once this update is performed, the signer deletes the key SK j?1 . Since squaring modulo N is a one-way function when the factorization of N is unknown, it is computationally infeasible to recover SK j?1 from SK j . Thus key exposure during period j will yield to an attacker the current key (and also future keys) but not past keys. We refer to S i;j as the i-th component of the period j secret key. Notice that the components of the secret key for period j are related to those of the base key as follows:
(S 1;j ; : : : ; S l;j ) = (S 2 j 1;0 ; : : : ; S 2 j l;0 ) : (1) We will use this later.
The length of a time period (during which a speci c key is in use) is assumed to be globally known. The choice depends on the application and desired level of protection against key exposure; it could vary from seconds to days. Thus, in the rst time period, the signer is computing 2 T -th roots; in the second time period, 2 T ?1 -th roots; and so on, until the last time period, where it is simply computing square roots. Notice that in the last time period, we simply have the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme. (The components of the secret key SK T are square roots of the corresponding components of the public key.) The hash function H: f0; 1g ! f0; 1g l will be assumed in the security analysis to be a random oracle.
Notice that the index j of the period during which the signature was generated is part of the signature itself. This provides some sort of \time-stamp", or claimed time-stamp, and is a crucial element of the scheme and model, since security will pertain to the ability to generate signatures having such \time-stamps" with value earlier than the current date. The signature scheme is fully speci ed by the above four algorithms. We let FSIG k; l; T] denote our scheme when the parameters are xed as indicated. Cost. The scheme FSIG is quite e cient. Signing in period j takes T +1?j +l=2 multiplications modulo N on the average. (So the worst case cost does not exceed T + 1 + l multiplications, and in fact the scheme gets faster as time progresses.)
For typical values of the parameters, this can be less than the cost of a single exponentiation, making signing cheaper than in RSA based schemes. Veri cation has the same cost as signing. (We ignore the cost of hashing, which is lower than that of the modular arithmatic.)
Like the Fiat-Shamir scheme, however, the key sizes are relatively large, being proportional to l. The size of the public key can be reduced by having its components U 1 ; : : : ; U l speci ed implicitly rather than explicitly, as values of a random-oracle hash funcion on some xed points. That is, the signer can choose some random constant U, say 128 bits long, and then specify small values a 1 ; : : : ; a l such that H (U; a i ) is a square modulo N, where H is a hash function with range Z N . The public key is now (N; T; U; a 1 ; : : : ; a l ). Since N is a BlumWilliams integer, the signer can then compute a 2 T +1 -th root of u i = H(U; a i ), and thereby have a secret key relating to the public key in the same way as before. The average size of the list a 1 ; : : : ; a l is very small, about O(l lg(l)) bits.
Unfortunately it is not possible to similarly shrink the size of the secret key in this scheme, but moving to post-Fiat-Shamir identi cation-derived signature schemes, one can get shorter keys. Validity of genuine signatures. Before we discuss security, we should check that signatures generated by the signing process will always be accepted by the veri cation process. N using Equation (1) and the fact that the signature was correctly generated:
as desired. Security model. We wish to assess the forward security of our scheme. To do this e ectively we must rst pin down an appropriate model; what can the adversary do, and when is it declared successful?
Recall the goal is that even under exposure of the current secret key it should be computationally infeasible for an adversary to forge a signature \with respect to" a previous secret key. The possibility of key exposure is modeled by allowing the adversary a \break-in" move, during which it can obtain the secret key SK j of the current period j. The adversary is then considered successful if it can create a valid forgery where the signature has the form hi; (Y; M)i for some i < j, meaning is dated for a previous time period. The model is further augmented to allow the adversary a chosen-message attack prior to its break-in. In that phase, the adversary gets to obtain genuine signatures of messages of its choice, under the keys SK 1 ; SK 2 ; : : : in order, modeling the creation of genuine signatures under the key evolution process. The adversary stops the chosen-message attack phase at a point of its choice and then gets to break-in. Throughout the adversary is allowed oracle access to the hash function H since the latter is modeled as a random oracle.
Thus the adversary F is viewed as functioning in three stages: the chosen message attack phase (cma); the break-in phase (breakin); and the forgery phase It is understood above that in running F we rst pick and x coins for it, and also that we preserve its state across its various invocations. The chosenmessage attack re ects the way the signature scheme is used. The adversary rst gets access to an oracle for generating signatures under SK 1 . It queries this as often as it wants, and indicates it is done by outputting some value d. As long as d is not the special value breakin, we move into the next stage, providing the adversary an oracle for signing under the next key. Note that the process is strictly ordered; once an adversary gives up the oracle for signing under SK j , by moving into the next phase or breaking-in, it cannot obtain access to that oracle again. At some point the adversary decides to use its break-in privelege, and is returned the key SK j of the stage in which it did this. (If it does not break-in by the last period, we give it the key of that period by default.) It will now try to forge signatures under SK b for some b < j and is declared successful if the signature is valid and the message is new.
Following the concrete security paradigm used in 4], we associate to the scheme an insecurity function whose value is the maximum probability of being able to break the scheme, the maximum being over all adversary strategies restricted to resource bounds speci ed as arguments to the insecurity function.
To make this precise we begin by letting Succ fwsig (FSIG k; l; T]; F) denote the probability that the above experiment returns 1. (This is the probability that the adversary F is successful in breaking FSIG in the forward security sense.)
Then the insecurity function is de ned as InSec fwsig (FSIG k; l; T]; t; q sig ; q hash ) = max The maximum here is over all F for which the following are true; the execution time of the above experiment, plus the size of the code of F, is at most t; F makes a total of at most q sig queries to the signing oracles across all the stages; the total number of queries made to H in the execution of the experiment is at most q hash .
Note the execution time is not just that of F but rather that of the entire experiment F-Forge(FSIG k; l; T]; F), so includes in particular the time to compute answers to oracle queries. The time to pick the hash function H is also included, measured dynamically by counting the time to reply to each hash oracle query by picking the response randomly at the time the query is made. Similarly, q hash is the number of H queries in the experiment, not just the number made explicitly by F, so that it includes the H queries made by the signing and verifying algorithms. In particular, q hash is always at least one due to the hash query made in the veri cation of the forgery.
The smaller the value taken by the insecurity function, the more secure the scheme. Our goal will be to upper bound the values taken by this insecurity function. Factoring. We will prove the security of our scheme by upper bounding its insecurity as a function of the probability of being able to factor the underlying modulus in time related to the insecurity parameters. To capture this, let Fct( ) be any algorithm that on input a number N, product of two primes, attempts to return its prime factors, and consider the experiment: Experiment Factor(k; Fct) Pick random, distinct k=2 bit primes p; q, each congruent to 1=3 lg(k) 2=3 . Security of our signature scheme. We are able to prove that as long as the problem of factoring Blum-Williams integers is computationally intractable, it is computationally infeasible to break the forward security of our signature scheme. The following theorem provides a precise, quantitative statement, upper bounding the forward insecurity of our scheme as a function of the insecurity of factoring. The security parameter k must be chosen large enough that the InSec fac (k; t 0 ) (the probability of being able to factor the modulus in time t 0 ) is very low.
The theorem then tells us that the probability of being able to compromise the forward security of the signature scheme is also low.
The theorem above proves the security of the scheme in a qualitative sense: certainly it implies that polynomial time adversaries have negligible advantage, which is the usual complexity based goal. However it also provides the concrete, or exact security, via the concrete indicated bound. In this case however, we know no attacks achieving a success matching our bound, and suspect our bound is not tight. Perhaps the concrete security can be improved, particularly with regard to the q hash T multiplicative factor.
The proof of this theorem is in two steps. Section 4 makes explicit an identication scheme that underlies the above signature scheme, and Lemma 1 shows that this identi cation scheme is forward secure as long as factoring is hard. Section 5 relates the forward security of our signature scheme to that of the identi cation scheme via Lemma 2. Putting these two lemmas together easily yields Theorem 1. We now turn to the lemmas. 4 Our forward-secure identi cation scheme Forward-secure identification. We consider the standard framework for a public-key based identi cation protocol. The prover is in possession of secret key SK 0 , while both the prover and the veri er are in possession of the corresponding public key PK . The prover wants to identify herself interactively to the veri er. A standard three-pass protocol will be used, consisting of a \commitment" Y from the prover, followed by a challenge c from the veri er, and nally an \answer" Z from the prover. The standard security concern is that an adversary (not in possession of the secret key) be able to identify itself to the prover under the public key PK of the legitimate prover.
We extend the setting to allow evolution of the secret key, enabling us to consider forward security. Thus the time over which the public key is valid is divided into T periods, and in period j the prover identi es itself using a secret key SK j . The public key remains xed, but the protocol and veri cation procedure depend on j, which takes the value of the current period, a value that all parties are agreed upon. Forward security means that an adversary in possession of SK j should still nd it computationally infeasible to identify itself to the veri er in a time period i previous to j. This security measure having been stated should, however, at once create some puzzlement. Identi cation is an \on-line" activity. More speci cally, verication is an on-line, one-time action. Once period i is over, there is no practical meaning to the idea of identifying oneself in period i; one cannot go back in time.
So forward security is not a real security concern or attribute in identi cation. So why consider it? For us, forward-secure identi cation is only a convenient mathematical game or abstraction based on which we can analyze the forward security of our signature scheme. (And forward security of the signature scheme is certainly a real concern: the di erence with identi cation is that for signatures veri cation can take place by anyone at any time after the signature is created.)
In other words, we can certainly de ne and consider a mathematically (if not practically) meaningful notion of forward security of an identi cation scheme, and analyze a scheme with regard to meeting this property. That is what we do here, for the purpose of proving Theorem 1.
The scheme. Keys (both public and secret) are identical to those of our signature scheme, and are generated by the same procedure KG that we described in Section 3, so that at the start of the game the prover is in possession of the base secret key SK 0 . The public key PK is assumed to be in possession of the veri er.
At the start of period j (1 j T) the prover begins by updating the previous secret key SK j?1 to the new secret key SK j that she will use in period j. This process is done by the same update algorithm as for the signature scheme, speci ed in Section 3. The update having been performed, the key SK j?1 is deleted. During period j, the prover and veri er may engage in any number of identi cation protocols with each other, as need dictates. In these protocols, it is assumed both parties are aware of the value j indicating the current period. The prover uses key SK j to identify herself. We depict in Figure 2 the identi cation protocol in period j, showing the steps taken by both the prover and the veri er.
The identi cation scheme is fully speci ed by key generation algorithm, key update algorithm, and the proving and verifying algorithms that underly It should of course be the case that when the prover is honest, the veri er accepts. The proof of this is just like the proof of Proposition 1, the analogous issue for the signature scheme.
As should be clear from the identi cation protocol of Figure 2 , the signing procedure under key SK j that we de ned in Section 3 is closely related to the identi cation protocol in period j: the former is derived from the latter by the standard process of specifying the challenge c via the value of a hash function on the message M and the commitment Y . This connection enables us to break the security analysis of the signature scheme into two parts; a forwardsecurity analysis of the identi cation scheme, and an analysis of the preservation of forward-security of the \challenge hash" paradigm. This section is devoted to the rst issue. We begin with the model. Security model. The adversary in an identi cation scheme is called an impersonator and is denoted I. It knows the public key PK of the legitimate prover, and the current period j. We view I as functioning in two stages: the break-in phase (breakin) and the impersonation phase (imp). Its success probability in breaking FID is determined by the following experiment: this paradigm works, in the sense that if the identi cation scheme is secure then so is the signature scheme 17, 15]. However we are not in the standard setting; we are considering an additional security property, namely forward security. The previous results do not address this. It turns out however that the hashing paradigm continues to work in the presence of forward security, in the following sense: if the identi cation scheme is forward secure, so is the derived signature scheme. This is a consequence of the following lemma: Lemma 2. Let FID k; l; T] and FSIG k; l; T] represent, respectively our key evolving identi cation scheme and our key evolving signature scheme, with parameters k; l; T. Then The lemma says that if the forward insecurity of the identi cation scheme is small, so is that of the signature scheme. Combining Lemmas 2 and 1 proves Theorem 1, the main theorem saying our signature scheme is forward secure. The proof of Lemma 2 is omitted due to lack of space, and can be found in the full version of this paper 2] which is available on the web.
